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HORIZONTAL RIGHTS AND CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
JUDICIALIZATION THROUGH LABOR DISPUTES
ERNEST CALDWELL*
INTRODUCTION
Western academics who criticize Chinese constitutionalism often
focus on the inability of the Supreme People's Court, China's highest
judicial body, to effectively enforce the rights of citizens enshrined
within the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Such criticism, I argue, is the result of analytical methods invested in American
constitutional discourse. These approaches focus on those Chinese
political issues that impede the institution of western-style judicial
review mechanisms, and often construe a 'right' as merely having vertical effect (i.e., portraying them as individual rights held against the
state). Drawing on recent scholarship that studies Chinese constitutionalism using its own categories and values, this article examines a
series of court cases involving employer-employee labor disputes. In
these cases, lower court judges actively engaged in constitutional interpretation and openly invoked and enforced horizontally oriented
socio-economic rights to prosecute exploitative labor practices. This
analysis demonstrates that the study of Chinese constitutionalism need
not be methodologically confined by the institutional paradigms or the
rights discourse of Euro-American constitutionalism. Due consideration should be given to the comparative implications of the judicialization of the constitution in lower courts, as well as the possibility of a
rights discourse emphasizing the positive enforcement of constitutionally enshrined rights on a horizontal axis (as opposed to defensive,
vertically oriented rights).
In this article, I first examine the problems commonly cited by
scholars when criticizing China's constitutional development. I then
demonstrate the shortcomings of two methodological perspectives,
which inform much of this criticism. I go on to argue that to better unin Chinese Law, School of Oriental and African Studies (School of Law), University of
London. I wish to thank Michael Dowdle, Tom Ginsburg, Arif Jamal, Leigh jenco, Terry Nardin,
Arun Thiruvengadam, Victor Ramraj, and A.P. Simester for thoughtful comments and engaging
discussions on this paper. The remaining flaws are the sole responsibility of the author.
* Lecturer
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derstand a Chinese conceptualization of constitutionalism one must be
willing to consider non-traditional (e.g., non-Anglo-American) techniques of constitutional engagement. Finally, I discuss three legal cases
dealing with labor disputes in which the lower courts openly cited and
interpreted the Chinese constitution to enforce labor rights of workers
vis-A-vis employers. These three cases highlight socio-economic conflict, particularly labor relations, as a potential key area in which the
Chinese government, or at least the judiciary, demonstrates a willingness to use constitutional arguments to defend the rights of Chinese
citizens.1 The findings of this article point to new avenues for inquiry
into comparative constitutionalism in general and Chinese constitutionalism in particular.
I.

CHINA'S CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA?

In the mere 60 years since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (hereafter, PRC) on October 1, 1949, the Chinese government has promulgated a total of five different constitutions, 1949,
1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 respectively.2 Each was created with the
intent of displaying major shifts in political power, enshrining the socialist goals of the dominant Chinese Communist Party (hereafter,
CCP), and accommodating changing socio-economic situations. The
constitution of 1975, for example, was a response to the unrest caused
by the disastrous Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
Mao Zedong and his supporters embedded much socialist rhetoric,
including direct references to Marx and Lenin, into the 1975 constitution in an attempt to bolster their diminished power, restore social and
political order, reaffirm the legal power of a constitution, and cast a
positive light on the tragic events occurring during the Cultural Revolution.s The number of articles was reduced to thirty, and the constitu1. The relationship between socio-economic conflict and constitutional development is in
no way alien to the study of Anglo-American forms of constitutionalism. An interesting analysis of
the dynamic interaction between labor law and constitutional development in eighteenth and
nineteenth century America is found in KAREN ORREN, Labor Regulation and ConstitutionalTheory
in the United States and England,22 POL. THEORY 98 (1994).
2. For a brief overview of Chinese constitutional history, see WILLIAM C. JONEs, The
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY ASIA (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
3. KEYUAN ZOU, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 29-30 (2006). Like Jones,
Zou argues that each constitution reflected a power transition or a massive ideological shift. Zou
also states that these new constitutions were 'personal' in that they reflect the ideologies of specific political individuals. The 1975 constitution was known as the "Gang of Four constitution,"
while the 1978 constitution, reflecting the political ideology of the powerful Hua Guofeng, was
aptly called the "Hua Guofeng constitution." Likewise, when Deng Xiaoping took control of the
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tion was heavily criticized in the west for its absence of individual
rights.4 The 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, however, explicitly enshrines a fairly substantial number of individual
rights.s Indeed, the 24 articles (articles 33-56) constituting Chapter II,
titled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" account for nearly
17% of total article content of the document.6 It should also be noted
that whereas in previous constitutions the chapter on "Fundamental
Rights and Duties of Citizens" was positioned as Chapter III, in the
1982 constitution it has been moved to the foreground just after Chapter 1, "General Principles," and before Chapter III, "Structure of Government."7 This has been seen by some scholars as an attempt by the
Chinese government to show to the world that they are taking citizens'
rights seriously.8
Interestingly, criticism is frequently leveled at China on the
grounds that although the Chinese constitution grants such a range of
individual rights (civil and socio-economic), it does not provide institutional mechanisms to enforce these rights. Such criticism typically emphasizes the Chinese government's frequent violations of human
rights, as well as violations through executive action or new legislation
of other rights guaranteed to citizens by the constitution. Yet the implication that the Chinese government is unwilling or unable to enforce
constitutional rights is not completely accurate.
It is true that China lacks a constitutional enforcement mechanism
similar to judicial review; however, in its place one finds an alternative
system which the Chinese call constitutional supervision.9 The constitution stipulates that the National People's Congress (hereafter, NPC),
the highest legislative body in the Chinese government, is empowered

Chinese government and instituted a massive set of economic reforms, another constitution was
promulgated which was labeled the "Deng Xiaoping constitution."
4. For example, during the Cultural Revolution several social groups were targeted, and in
many cases severely persecuted, for being counter-revolutionaries. Even after the failure of the
Cultural Revolution, legal means were utilized to prosecute 'scapegoats'. Critics note the absence
in the 1975 and 1978 constitutions of sections on the individual rights to equality under law,
which they argue allowed a legal basis for such persecutions. Jones, supra note 2, 57-60.
5. Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law, in Occasional
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemp. Asian Stud., 6-8 (No. 4-1985).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Cai Dingjian, ConstitutionalSupervision and Interpretation in the People's Republic of
China, 9 J.CHINESE L., 219, passim (1995).
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"to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution,"lo and that the
Standing Committee of the NPC (hereafter, Standing Committee) has
the authority "to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement."11 These articles explicitly place all constitutional matters within
the ambit of the legislative branch of the government to the exclusion
of the judiciary.12 However, the constitution does not stipulate the
method of enforcement nor what, specifically, enforcement actually
entails.13 Furthermore, the meetings of the NPC are much shorter than
other legislative bodies of the world. As a result, issues related to constitutional supervision are typically marginalized while its normal legislative duties are emphasized. Its Standing Committee, which
functions throughout the year as the legislature when the NPC is not in
session, has a total of twenty-one governmental functions, only one of
which is concerned with constitutional supervision. Thus, it has been
argued that constitutional supervision is often impeded by the massive
workloads assigned to these two bodies.14
Further complicating the matter is the complex relationship between the judiciary and the constitution, which at best can be characterized as ambiguous or at worst contradictory. The constitution
creates the judiciary to enforce the laws of the PRC.15 However, ambiguity arises from the fact that, while the constitution stipulates that it
"is the fundamental law of the State and has supreme legal authority,"16 (which means that the judiciary could enforce it as a law) it allocates sole power of its supervision and enforcement to the NPC. In the
past this has created uncertainty among judicial officials over the applicability of constitutional provisions in cases brought before the
courts. In 1955 the Supreme People's Court (hereafter, SPC), China's
highest judicial body, issued a practice statement affirming that the

10. XIANFA art. 62 (1982) (China). All citations in the paper to the Chinese Constitution,
Chinese legal statutes, and Chinese case reports come from the online database Chinalaw Information Service run by Peking University. See http://www.law.pkuedu.cn.
11. Id. at art. 67. For an excellent analysis of the constitutional power and practices of the
NPC and its Standing Committee, see Michael Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and
Operations of the National People's Congress, 11 COLUM. J.OF ASIAN L. 1 (1997).
12. It should be noted that the PRC government is highly centralized with the NPC serving as
the highest authority in the state and all other branches of government subsumed underneath it.
13. Chen Jianfu has argued that the each of the constitutions of China was meant to give
structure to and empower the government (and by extension the CCP) and was not intended to
provide a mechanism for challenging state authority. See J. CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN
UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITS NATURE, AND DEVELOPMENT 72-73 (1999).
14. LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INCHINA 299-300 (2000).

15. XIANFA art. 123-128 (1982).
16. Id. at Preamble.
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constitution was the supreme law of the land, but stated that its provisions could not be cited as a basis for decisions in criminal cases.17 This
issue arose once more in 1986, and in response the SPC once again
issued a statement regarding the sources of law to be used in legal proceedings. Interestingly, this statement does not explicitly prohibit citing and using the constitution as a source of law; however, the
constitution does not appear on the statement's list of laws judiciable
in courts.18 Judges and scholars alike interpreted this omission as an
implicit indication that the constitution and rights issues were to remain out of the courts.
Many scholars hold the view that frequent violations of citizens'
rights by the Chinese government are partly the result of the seemingly
inefficient practice of constitutional supervision and absence of involvement by the judiciary. There is no governmental body independent of the NPC to hold the NPC accountable for actions that contravene
the constitutional rights of Chinese citizens. Some argue that increasing the role of the judiciary in constitutional matters best solves China's constitutional rights dilemma. This is commonly framed within the
rhetoric of 'judicialization' of the constitution, or xianfa sifa hua, which
advocates institutionalizing a form of judicial review similar to that
practiced by liberal democratic governments, especially in common
law countries. By allowing concrete forms of judicial review, the ideals
of constitutional supremacy and the protection of enshrined citizens'
rights against the state could be upheld. This argument for constitutional judicialization frequently highlights protection of vertical rights
and the actions of China's highest court, the SPC. I argue that such a
bifurcated analysis manifests a certain selective myopia that too narrowly defines constitutionalism, as well as the relationship between
constitutions and constitutionally enshrined rights.19 It fails to
17. Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional
Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT'L J.CONST. L. 215, 221-23 (2009).
18. Id. at221.
19. This narrowness is the byproduct of an overly functionalist approach to the study of
constitutionalism. The very term "constitutionalism" is defined as it developed in the west. For
those taking this functionalist approach when conducting a comparative study, this western
definition of "constitutionalism" becomes the dominant comparative referent and provides a
'check-list' of attributes for which structural equivalents performing analogous functions must be
discovered in order for what is being compared to qualify as "constitutionalism." Yet, the limitations of such a rigid functionalist approach have been pointed out by several scholars of comparative law and comparative political theory. Many of these critiques often point to the fact that such
'check-list' approaches depict specific concepts as static or fully-developed, and thus preclude the
possibility future development or preclude the possibility that a transplanted concept, like constitutionalism, could not be altered, re-interpreted, or re-defined within another socio-political
system. For an overview of the limitations of the functionalist approach in comparative law see,
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acknowledge the existence of constitutional engagement by the lower
courts in China in cases involving horizontal rights violations, in particular labor disputes.
II. AIMING Low: ESCAPE FROM THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PARADIGM

One of the methodological issues impeding a fairer assessment of
Chinese constitutional development is the high value placed on upperlevel court references to constitutional issues, i.e. decisions of the Supreme People's Court. This emanates in part from a US-based common
law mentality, which emphasizes a pyramidal court hierarchy and links
judicial independence with a checks-and-balances function between
government branches over constitutional issues.2o Thus, much scholarship, especially that coming from common law academics, emphasizes the role of supreme courts as defenders of the constitution.21 Such a
methodological stance precludes consideration of the viability of alternative institutional structures of constitutional review that exist even
in western democracies.22 However, many scholars still insist on judicial review as the sole viable solution to China's constitutional 'problems,' and view it as an essential marker indicative of 'true'
constitutional development. Such a viewpoint precludes consideration
of potential for China's alternative constitutional trajectory to contribute to our own understanding of constitutional development.
This preoccupation with judicial review leads to a second problem. When looking for evidence of incipient judicialization of the constitution, an emphasis on judicial review narrows the scope of

MICHELE GRAZIADEL, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND

TRANSITIONS 108-25 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). See also Michael Dowdle,
Constitutional Listening, 88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 117 (2012).
20. For the methodological problems associated with U.S. constitutional exceptionalism and
the use of the U.S. constitutional paradigm as a dominant comparative referent, see Michael W.
Dowdle, China's Transition and the Limits of the American Constitutional Perspective, in IS CHINA
TRAPPED IN TRANSITION? IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE REFORMS (The Foundation for Law, Justice and
Society 2007).
21. There are, however, some critics of judicial supremacy within Anglophone scholarship,
especially advocates of the "departmental review" theory of constitutional interpretation and
enforcement. In this theory, constitutional interpretation does not rest solely within the purview
of the judiciary, but instead, individual branches of the government are responsible for determining constitutional controversies affecting their spheres of influence. See SUSAN R.BURGESS, CONTEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 1-27 (Univ. Press of
Kansas, 1992).
22. These approaches often fail to consider alternative models of constitutional review, in
particular that of France. There the constitution is completely outside the purview of the judiciary
and a separate Constitutional Council has been established. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO

PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 135 (3d ed. 2007).
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scholarly inquiry to high court decisions, specifically those of the SPC.
This, in turn, precludes analysis of lower level court cases, which surprisingly show a relatively high level of constitutional engagement and
rights discourse when compared to the SPC.23 In this section, I will
consider the implications of this second methodological problem and
offer an example which illustrates the value of looking to lower-court
decisions as sources of constitutional engagement and rights protection.
At the lowest levels of China's four-tiered judicial system-that is,
the People's Courts and People's Tribunals-judicial officials accept
litigation concerning the rights of individuals.24 Not only do they accept such cases for adjudication, but in doing so, the judges appear to
be encouraging a form of weiquan, or rights argumentation to take
place within the official court system.25 Of particular interest is the fact
that much of this litigation is directed towards violations of basic rights
of individuals made by quasi-official governmental offices of the elected village committees.
In 1988, small, localized village elections were instituted in much
of rural China.26 Many political scientists interpreted this move by the
Chinese government as a victory for future Chinese democratization,
and concluded that once citizens found that they could vote out inefficient or corrupt village officials they would demand similar electoral
rights at the township level and on up. Studies have shown that the
institution of such elections has obtained a measure of success in
providing a sense of empowerment to many villagers and an increase
in rights-consciousneSS.27 Even if true, however, the fear of being voted
out of office has not precluded village committees from making formal
decisions that contravene the law and infringe upon the basic legal
(and in some cases constitutional) rights of villagers. More specifically,
many village committees have neglected or even denied the rights of
'married-out' women (i.e., women who marry into a family outside of
23. A brief survey of the Chinalaw Information Databasefor legal cases which contain constitutional references yielded 14 results. See also Kellogg, supra note 17, 228.
24. For an overview of the Chinese court structure, see JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT
AND TRANSFORMATION 148-61 (2008).

25. Stephanie Balme notes that of the 2,400 plus cases administered in a small People's
Tribunals in a suburb of the Chinese province of Sha'anxi, nearly 15 percent deal with 'weiquan'
issues. See Stephanie Balme, OrdinaryJusticeand PopularConstitutionalism in China, in BUILDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM INCHINA 183 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009).
26. For a succinct overview of the development of village elections in China, see Lianjiang Li,
The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China, 43 ASIAN SURV. 648-62 (2003).
27. Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China, 27 MOD.
CHINA 407 (2001),
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their own village and thus reside in their husbands' village) to acquire
compensation or benefits from collectively-owned land in their home
villages or from similar lands of the villages which they married into.
Some village committees have denied legally registered individuals
their constitutional right to vote.
Stephanie Balme has analyzed the development of rights discourse in cases of 'married-out' women mediated in People's Tribunals. People's Tribunals are basically subdivisions of the county court
system comprised of lower-level court judges and allow access to justice for people in rural areas. As such, these Tribunals accept different
types of cases, have different procedures, and are typically more oriented towards mediation.28 The problem of 'married-out' women and
their rights regarding collectively-owned village land affects most
provinces of China. One of the primary reasons for discrimination
against the rights of such women is economic. Income gained from
collectively-owned lands is divided amongst those villagers registered
as living within that particular village-thus, the fewer members within the village, the larger the share for each member.29 As such, it is frequently the case that women who are 'married-out' find themselves in
legal purgatory when it comes to the collection of their share from
collectively-owned lands. Their home village committees typically deny the women's affiliation because they live in another village, and the
villages into which they married often consider them to be outsiders.
Village committees sometimes even go so far as to refuse to
acknowledge a valid residency registration (hukou) or the legal transfer of a residency registration (which entitles one to a share of communal earnings).3o
Balme examines several cases which she believes illustrate a situation in which Tribunal mediations prove to be more effective than the
formal judiciary in protecting rights, and are a more likely place for the
further developing of what she terms, 'popular constitutionalism.'31
Contrary to the formal courts, which Balme believes are overly bureaucratic and impeded by the scrutiny of the Adjudication Committee,
the Tribunals, while still comprised of judicial officials, are nevertheless free from top-down scrutiny and lack rigid procedures.32

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Balme, supra note 25, at 195-96.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
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Balme's argument demonstrates several important issues related
to China's constitutional development, especially at lower-levels of
government. The first is a growing consciousness by the Chinese citizens of their rights, as well as their knowledge of formal avenues of
recourse should those rights be infringed upon by others, even the
elected pseudo-governmental Village Committee. Second, it suggests
that at the lower levels of the Chinese court structure judicial officials
are more willing to openly engage in rights-based litigation/mediation,
even when it involves confronting the actions of pseudo-government
committees.
The next case, which concerns government infringement of the
constitutional right to vote, further illustrates this point.
Violations of rights related to the election of village committee
members have also found their ways into lower-level courtrooms. Unlike the above cases of 'married-out' women where conflict arose from
more self-interested, economic motives of the village committee members, in the case of Wu Shaohui v Villagers' Electoral Committee of Luxia
Village, Fujian33 there arose a conflict between the constitutional and
statutory right to vote in village elections and official regulations
promulgated from the Department of Civil Affairs in Fujian Province.
In 2003, Wu Shaohui was refused voter registration privileges by
the village electoral committee of Luxia Village, Pingnan County, Fujian.34 Wu had resided in Luxia for a long time, but moved his permanent hukou-registration to Luxia Village only on June 12, 2003, thereby
being considered a villager with non-agricultural permanent residency.3s For many years previous to 2003, Wu had participated in the village elections of Luxia (even being nominated for the village head
position in 2000), yet in 2003 (after the formal residency transfer was
completed) the village committee refused to allow him to register to
vote in the upcoming village elections.36 The committee cited a provincial regulation promulgated by the Fujian Department of Civil Affairs
that stated, "a person with non-agricultural permanent residency subject to the administration of a village shall not be registered to vote."37

33. Wu Shaohui v. the Villagers' Electoral Committee of Luxia Village, ChinaLaw Information
Service, July 8, 2003, at 1-2 (People's Ct. of Pingnan Cnty., Fujian Province).
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id
37. Id.
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They further held that based on the aforementioned regulation all prior registrations of Wu were erroneous and invalid.38
Wu Shaohui brought a claim against the village committee to the
People's Court of Pingnan County (the lowest court in the judiciary)
and asked the court to order the village committee to register him and
to void the results of the election.39 The court held in part for the plaintiff, the village committee was ordered to register Wu, but the election
results were not invalidated.40 In reaching a decision, the court had to
confront the problem of a provincial government regulation, which
contradicted national law related to village elections as well as other
provincial laws of Fujian.41 The court began by stating rather bluntly
that the right to elect or be elected is a basic political right enshrined
within the constitution,42 The right, as referenced by the judiciary, is
found in Article 34 of the constitution, which states:
All citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the
age of 18 have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of
nationality, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief,
education, property status, or length of residence, except persons
deprived of political rights according to laW.43
This phrasing is repeated in Article 12 of the Organic Law of the
Villager Committees of the PRC (1998) (hereafter, OLVC).44
The court determined that since Wu Shaohui was thirty-three
years old, he was, according to national law, eligible to vote.4s The conflict, however, stemmed from the Fujian provincial government's exercise of their regulatory powers found in Article 14, paragraph 4 of the
OLVC which states "specific electoral measures shall be prescribed by
the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses of the provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities."46 Based on this authority,
the legislative body of the Fujian provincial government issued one set
of regulations which stated "...where a person with voter's qualification has recently moved into a village ... the relevant registration for

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.at 2-3.
41. Id. at 1-2.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People's Republic of China (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Nov. 4, 1998, effective Nov. 4, 1998) art. 17, translated in Chinalaw Information Service.
45. Wu Shaohui, supra note 33, at 2.
46. Id.
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voters shall be made."47 Yet another set of regulations, already stated
above, revokes the right to voter registration for persons with nonagriculturalpermanent residency.48 The court held that this latter provincial regulation was in conflict with all of the above stated constitutional, national, and provincial laws just mentioned, and as such was
invalid. Although the provincial legislature technically had the authority to make such a regulation, in adjudging this case, a small county
court struck down its application because it violated the basic political
right to vote enshrined within the constitution and in the OLVC.
These two types of legal issues handled by the People's Tribunals
and People's Courts are significant in that they illustrate an increased
consciousness of ordinary citizens of their rights, an awareness of effective means of recourse when those rights are threatened, and a willingness of these two institutions to become involved in such cases.
Because these cases do not necessarily involve the participation of the
SPC or the striking down of central government legislation and actions,
this might not register with most legal scholars focusing too narrowly
on evidence of constitutionalism within upper-levels of government.
However, if one accepts as elements of constitutionalism the public
consciousness of individual rights, a functioning government institution to enforce such rights, and a willingness to hold elected officials as
bound by the law, then one has to see merit in Balme's conception of a
'popular constitutionalism' in county Tribunals and in the constitutional interpretation of the small county court of Pingnan to uphold Wu
Shaohui's right to vote in village elections. Thus, the decisions of lower
courts warrant additional consideration as potential sources for constitutional development and engagement in China.
III. HORIZONTAL RIGHTS AND THE "INDIRECT EFFECT"

The next methodological problem affecting the study of Chinese
constitutionalism concerns the scholarly emphasis on vertical, defensive rights violations in China. Among many, and even Chinese, constitutional scholars, the primary criticism leveled at the Chinese
government centers on its failure to protect and enforce constitutionally guaranteed individual rights againstthe state.
The perspective of such criticism certainly conforms to the paradigmatic "judicial power" developmental trajectory of North Atlantic
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1.
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constitutionalism, in which the constitution is seen as an inviolable
source of protection for the ordinary citizen against state encroachment and the judiciary is vested with the power to protect against such
state engendered rights infringement. Using this paradigm to interpret
China, however, inevitably conditions scholarship to focus all too narrowly on state-citizen conflict as an indicator of constitutional engagement. This is typically manifest in the form of legislation or
executive regulations that conflict with constitutionally enshrined individual rights, and the potential role of the SPC in reviewing and striking down such rules. There is relatively little effort made to move
beyond this vertically-orientated rights discourse and explore alternative axes of constitutional rights engagement.
When considering the development of rights discourse within the
west, however, the source of this bias is fairly clear. Martin Loughlin
has shown that rights discourse is intimately connected with the liberal democratic tradition that developed in Europe incrementally in response to a growing awareness of alternative configurations of power
dynamics associated with the individual vis-A-vis the state.49 Within
this milieu of changing power dynamics, the notion emerged that "constitutions" should be utilized to limit government power for the benefit
of the people; such a notion was of course predicated on the concept of
a vertically-oriented, defensive right.so Kim Scheppele argues that such
'vertical' concerns were amplified after the atrocities associated with
the Second World War and greatly affected the scope of constitutional
development and the agenda of rights discourse.51 Similarly, Charles
Parkinson's examination of the political rhetoric associated with bills
of rights incorporation into the newly formed constitutions of postcolonial nations demonstrates an underlying concern with protecting
minority rights (primarily the rights of former colonialists who decided to remain in the former colony after independence was granted)
once a predictable majority (e.g., the former colonial subjects) was
democratically elected.52 Thus, within the constitutional history of
North Atlantic liberal democracies, the developing role of individual
rights has been inextricably linked to the tension between the citizen
49.
50.

MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 119 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
For a brief overview of the development of the concept of "constitution," see Graham

Maddox, Constitution, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 50 (Terence Ball et al. eds.,

1989).
51. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Agendas of Comparative Constitutionalism, LAW AND COURTS
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n), Spring 2003, at 4, 11-13.
52. CHARLES 0. PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
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and the state. Any constitutional engagement must meet the criterion
of involving some form of state-citizen conflict.
This single-axis perspective of rights conflict, however, typically
precludes an examination of constitutional development and constitutional engagement along alternative axes, namely the horizontal enforcement of constitutionally enshrined rights. Within horizontal conconflict, constitutional norms transition from defensive to positive
individual rights, and the role of the state transitions from the source
of the threat to an agent enforcing the constitutional rights of a citizen
infringed upon by non-governmental third parties. It is specifically
along this horizontal axis that one can observe interesting interpretations and applications of constitutional provisions within the courtrooms of various constitutional systems.
Indeed, the constitutional experience of some liberal democracies
provides examples of this very phenomenon of horizontal rights application. Examining several judgments from the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany, Mattias Kumm notes increasing evidence for the
constitutionalization of German private law, which, he argues, depicts
an ideological trend towards developing a concept of a "total constitution."53 Expanding on Carl Schmitt's idea of a total state, Kumm defines
a total constitution as one in which "constitutional rights not only establish a comprehensive system of defenses of the individual against
potential excesses of the state: Instead, a key function of constitutional
rights is to provide the basis for claims against public authorities to
intervene on behalf of rights-claimant in response to threats from third
parties."54 As a further characteristic of a total constitution, Kumm
states that "if a total state provides no judicial enforcement of constitutional rights a total constitution provides the constitutional resources
to constitutionalize all political and legal conflicts-it constrains and
guides their resolution in the name of constitutional rights. By means
of its constitutional rights provisions a total constitution provides the
general normative standards-even if stated in term s of abstract principle-for the resolution of all legal and political conflicts that occur
within its jurisdiction."ss
Kumm's evidence for the development of a total constitution in
Germany comes from the emerging judicial doctrine of "indirect effect"
53.
and the
54.
55.

Mattias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles
Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L. J.341, 366 (2006).
Id. at 344.
Id.
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(mittelbare Drittwirkung), as articulated in the Lueth case.56 The central question in this case was whether or not constitutional rights have
a horizontal effect.s7 The court held that, "constitutional rights are not
just defensive rights of the individual against the state, but embody an
objective order of values, which applies to all areas of the law... and
which provides guidelines and impulses for the legislature, administration and judiciary."s
This indirect effect shifts the axis of a constitutional provision
from a defensive, vertical to a positive, horizontal orientation in that it
requires, on a constitutional basis, positive action by the State to ensure the protection of individual rights from infringement by third
parties. Kumm notes that the Constitutional Court has recently addressed cases in which individuals argue that the state has a constitutional duty to improve nuclear reactor safety standards for the
protection of individuals living around a reactor, to negotiate with terrorists to protect the rights of those held hostage, and to provide increased university spaces to protect the right to choose a profession.59
In each of these cases, the third party is the source of the problem (i.e.,
a nuclear power plant, a terrorist, or a university admissions office),
but the litigation is designed to provoke action by the state. This is a
key feature of the indirect effect; that the public authorities are still the
addressees of complaints, not the third party. Yet Kumm believes that
in Germany the practice of this indirect effect doctrine has resulted in
the constitutionalization of private laW.6o He argues that:
The practical difference between indirect and direct effect, however,
is negligible. It concerns merely the formal construction of the legal
issue and has no implications whatsoever for questions relating to
substantive outcomes or institutional competence... If,in a surprise
56. Id. at 346. The Lueth case began as a torts issue and soon developed into a constitutional
issue over the relationship between the freedom of speech and civil code provisions. In 1950,
Erich Lueth called for a boycott of a film by former Third Reich anti-semitic film producer Viet
Harlan. Harlan and the studio petitioned for a court injunction against his boycott arguing that
such an act was intended to cause harm (thus, granting compensation under the German Civil
Code [BGBJ) and qualified for an injunction against the boycott. The lower court held in favor of
Harlan; yet Lueth argued that such a decision conflicted with the constitutional right to freedom
of speech. The case made its way up to the German Federal Constitutional Court. For an overview
of the case, see Oliver Gerstenberg, What Constitutions Can Do (But Courts Sometimes Don't):
Property, Speech, and the Influence of Constitutional Norms on Private Law (Center for European
Studies Working Paper Series), availableat
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Gerstenberg.pdf.http://www.ces.fas.ha
rvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Gerstenberg.pdf.
57. Kumm, supra note 53, 350.
58. Id. (citing the Lueth case)
59. Id.at351.
60. Id.at352.
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move, the constitutional legislator were to amend the Constitution
and explicitly determine that constitutional rights were also applicable to the relationship between individuals, it would change practi-

cally nothing. There would be a difference in the way complaints
could be framed: instead of naming the public authorities, which are
currently the addressees of the complaints, the complainant could
simply name the other private party as the defendant in the case.
And the challenged act would be the act of the private individual rather than that of the public authorities.61
Kumm's discussion of the doctrine of "indirect effect" provides
useful, comparative examples of constitutional development that does
not necessarily conform to archetypical -American constitutional paradigms or standard liberal democratic rights discourse.
There are interesting parallels to the German domestic concept of
"indirect effect" and horizontal rights found within the realm of international law, particularly international human rights litigation. Decisions handed down from international courts, such as the European
Court of Human Rights, evince an evolving concept of an individual
right that is no longer understood as merely a defensive measure of
individual protection, but also considered a positive right that imposes
a duty on the state to enforce it. As Jean-Frangois Akandji-Kombe
points out, the European Court of Human Rights understands part of
its role vis-A-vis the signing members of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) as "in practice require[ing] national authorities
to take the necessary measures to safeguard a right or, more precisely,
to take the necessary measures to safeguard a right or, more specifically, to adopt reasonable and suitable measures to protect the rights of
the individual."62 Thus, the dynamics of rights enforcement has been
altered. In the case of the European Court, the litigation frequently
involves an individual bringing a human rights case to the Court
against a government which is, in effect, a third party. Other scholars
have noted that this third party does not necessarily have to be a government agency, but could very well be a non-governmental actor,
such as international corporations, social institutions, or another individual.63 Such instances provide a conceptual foundation for the poten61. Id.
62. Jean-Francois Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on
Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Obligations Under the European
Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe) 2007.
63. For an earlier argument over the necessity of moving constitutional rights into the
private sphere, see Christoph Beat Graber & Gunther Teubner, Art and Money: Constitutional
Rights in the Private Sphere?, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). For more on the impact of globalization
and internationalization of law on the concept of horizontal rights, see Gunther Teubner, Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL
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tial development of horizontal rights litigation internationally, as well
as domestically.64
Unfortunately, despite these examples, the 'vertical' rights orientation continues to dominate both rights-based and constitutional discourse in comparative law, particularly when discussing domestic
constitutional development. When aimed at China in particular, critiques of the judiciary or rights violations become inextricably linked
to, and even informed by, the rhetoric of Chinese liberalization, democratization, and its citizens' quest for individual protection from the
state. As Kellogg has stated,
[i]t is the explication and elucidation of constitutional norms
through jurisprudence that leads to the creation of meaningful constitutional rights doctrine and which creates concrete and binding
rights obligations on states. Without the ability to interpret constitutional rights provisions in a way that limits state power, it is difficult
to see how the courts can make use of the Constitution in a meaningful way. Thus, despite the existence of potentially differing conceptualizations of constitutionalism, true constitutionalism is still
inextricably linked to vertical, defensive rights issues and its development requiresjudicial interpretation and enforcement.65
In the following section, I examine a series of Chinese lower court
decisions involving labor disputes which evince interesting parallels to
Kumm's doctrine of "indirect effect." These disputes stem from unfair
contractual terms which limit the liability of employers for injuries
sustained by laborers in the workplace. It is clear from the language of
the decisions that when the judges openly cite the constitution and
make constitutional interpretations, they are invoking a socialist rhetoric contained within the constitution aimed at protecting common
laborers from exploitative practices, and by extension affirm the duty
of the state to actively protect constitutionally enshrined labor rights.
As such, they articulate an understanding of the constitution as functioning along a horizontal axis.

GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 6-7, 12 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther
Teubner eds., 2004).
64. There is a steadily growing number of scholarly works dedicated to the development of
horizontal rights enforcement within international and domestic legal spheres. An excellent
collection of such studies focusing on countries ranging from France and Great Britain to Israel
and Greece can be found in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Dawn

Oliver & Jorg Fedtke eds., 2007).
65. Kellogg, supra note 17, at 227.
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IV. LABOR DISPUTES AND THE CHINESE "DIRECT EFFECT"

The above sections of this article argue for the need to examine
Chinese constitutionalism on its own terms. That is, before criticizing,
or worse condemning, Chinese constitutional development, one should
demonstrate more self-reflexive consideration of the criteria used to
analyze the subject. The examples given in Section II and Section III
illustrate the value of looking beyond the archetypical American constitutional experience, and urge scholars to focus on the role of lower
courts by considering the development of constitutional discourse,
which does not focus on vertical rights enforcement. In this section, I
turn my attention to three court cases dealing with labor contract disputes, which effectively combine these two new areas of constitutional
inquiry.
To begin with, the institution of Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernizations during the late 1970s through the 1980s paved the way for China's massive economic growth.66 Central to these reforms was a
restructuring of the Chinese economy, shifting it from the earlier socialist planned economy towards a socialist market economy.67 This
included a level of entrepreneurial privatization accompanied by a
"transition from the 'iron rice bowl system' to labor contracts."68 For
many CCP leaders charged with guiding a government founded upon
an ideology permeated with elements of Marxism and socialism, and
whose authority is in part derived from their open defense of such an
ideology, the introduction of a market economy and privatization of
certain industries raised concerns over the potential reappearance of
exploitative labor practices and unequal class development.
Indeed, at the outset Chinese law was ill-equipped to handle the
new issues arising from the economic transition, such as increased
wage discrepancy between employers and employees, unequal contract terms, and unregulated safety standards.69 Labor law reform was
66. For a critical assessment of Deng Xiaoping's economic thought and his legacy, see Barry
Naughton, Deng Xiaoping: The Economist, 135 THE CHINA Q. 491, 505-06, 510-12 (1993). For more
on the types of legal and economic reforms associated with privatization of specific enterprises
and the continuing role of government owned enterprises, see LIANG BIN, THE CHANGING CHINESE
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1978-PRESENT: CENTRALIZATION OF POWER AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

21-41 (2008).
67. Bin, supra note 66, at 34-37.
68. RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INCHINA 6 (2010).
69. Anita Chan has written extensively on the influence of the rise in China's share of the
global market and the development of exploitative labor practices in the Chinese workplace. See
her highly informative book, ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF
LABOR IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (Mark Selden ed., 2001).
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slow to develop alongside economic reform, and as labor laws developed their impact was unevenly distributed among the workforce.70
Further, China did not pass a national labor law until 1994, and even
then the ambiguity of this law (including its promise for future legislation) led to much confusion and manipulation.
Interestingly, this nexus of problems-the dilemma of China's socialist ideology in the face of a thriving market economy and the underdeveloped legal realm of Chinese labor law-proves to be a fertile
ground for understanding a new dimension to China's constitutional
development. The three legal cases examined below demonstrate how
judges in lower courts interpreted, and even cited, constitutional provisions to invalidate express contractual terms exculpating employers
from any liability for employee injuries occurring at the workplace.
These judgments provide insight into the ways in which judges utilized
constitutional arguments, particularly socialist interpretations emphasizing the State's duty to protect workers from exploitative labor practices, to serve as legal 'stop-gaps' at a time when China's labor and
contract laws lacked specific provisions protecting employees from
unfair contractual terms.
A.

The Case ofZhang Lianqi and Zhang Guoli v Zhang Xuezhen7l

In October of 1986, Zhang Guosheng was contracted to assist in
the demolition of a building at the Tianjin Alkali Factory by Zhang Xuezhen (same last name, but no relation), owner of the Youth Cooperation Service Station of Workers' New Village of Tanggu District of
Tianjin.72 On November 17, 1986, while removing concrete crossbeams, several beams suddenly cracked creating a dangerous work
environment.73 Work was ordered to resume, but then another beam
broke causing Zhang Guosheng to fall and injure his ankle.74 He was
taken to the hospital, diagnosed with hematoma and sprain of the medial left ankle bone, and subsequently released.75 On November 21 he
was again rushed to the hospital, but later, on December 7, died of sepsis and putrescence of tissue resulting from the previously sustained

70.
71.
1998.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Brown, supra note 68, at 3-6.
Zhang Lianqi and Zhang Guo Li v Zhang Xuezhen, Chinalaw Information Service, Dec. 24,
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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injury.76 The family of Zhang Guosheng suffered a total loss of
17,600.40 RMB in medical expenses and lost wages.77 As a result, his
father and sister, Zhang Lianqi and Zhang Guoli respectively, requested
that the Labor Bureau of Tanggu District decide whether or not Zhang
Xuezhen was liable to pay for the said economic loss.78 The Labor Bureau confirmed the liability, but Zhang Xuezhen disapproved.79 Thus,
Zhang Lianqi and Zhang Guoli brought a civil suit against Zhang Xuezhen in the People's Court of Tanggu District claiming compensation
for economic loss arising from the work related injury and the subsequent death of Zhang Guosheng.80
At the trial, the defendant claimed that there should be no liability
citing, inter alia, an absence of a clear causal link between Zhang Guosheng's work injury and his death, and also provided a registration
form signed by the deceased upon agreeing to work for the defendant.81 It contained the clause: "Work-related injuries shall not be the
responsibility (of the service station)."82 Medical reports confirmed the
link between the work injury and Zhang Guosheng's death, and the
Court found the defendant negligent in taking steps to maintain a safe
environment for workers once hidden dangers were known (i.e., once
it was known that the beams were unstable).83 Citing Articles 106 (2)
and 119 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic
of China, which prescribe civil liabilities to individuals who cause injury to the personal safety of others, the Court held that the defendant
was liable for medical expenses accrued by Zhang Guosheng's hospitalization, loss of potential income, and living expenses of any dependants.84
Before arriving at this decision, however, the Court had to address
the liability exclusion clause contained within the registration form
signed by the deceased. The issue at point was whether or not the
aforementioned articles of the General Principles of Civil Law could be
applied if the deceased had willfully released the defendant of liability.
The registration form clearly stated that the defendant could not be

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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held liable for any injuries suffered onsite.85 Surprisingly, the Court
brazenly utilized a constitutional argument to invalidate the clause
stating: "Our Constitution explicitly stipulates that labor protection will
be provided to laborers. This is a right which is enjoyed by laborers, it
is protected by the State's laws, and no individual or organization may
wantonly infringe upon it."86
It should be noted that the Chinese constitution is not directly
quoted in the Court's judgment. Furthermore, the constitution does not
"explicitly stipulate" that labor protection must be provided to laborers. The only possible provision within the constitution which approaches the meaning of the above Court statement is found in
paragraph 2 of Article 42 under Chapter II "Rights and Duties of Citizens." Article 42 states that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China
have the right as well as the duty to work," and subsumed under this is
the following paragraph 2: "Using various channels, the State creates
conditions for employment, strengthens labor protection, improves
working conditions and, on the basis of expanded production, increases remuneration for work and social benefits."87 It appears that from a
constitutional right to work and the subsequent phrase, "the State ...
strengthens labor protection" the judges took an interesting approach
to constitutional interpretation whereby they extrapolated an additional implied constitutional right to labor protection. It is not expressly stated how the exclusion clause violated this provision, but I can see
one possibility. Paragraph 2 obligates the State to strengthen labor protection88 and by using the limited liability contract clause, the defendant had impeded the State in its ability to provide, strengthen, or
enforce that labor protection. Through judicial interpretation, a constitutional right was transformed into a positive right and the State was
then constitutionally requiredto enforce the plaintiff's right to labor
safety. Furthermore, having expanded the ambit of this right, the Court
seems to have been able to reason that the exemption clause also indicated a desire by the defendant to exclude herself from the responsibility of providing the constitutionally guaranteed labor protection. As
such, the Court held that the clause effectively "violated the Constitu-

85. Id.
86. Id. (author's translation)
87. XIANFA, art. 42 (1982) (China).
88. Id.
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tion and relevant labor laws and regulations,89 seriously violated socialist social morality and is classified as a null and void civil act."9o
Although this decision comes very close to illustrating an instance
in which the Court expressly invokes the constitution to formulate a
judgment, it must be remembered that the judiciary has no authority to
enforce the constitution, nor is it permitted to quote or cite the constitution. Therefore, the statement that the clause "is classified as a null
and void civil act" is particularly important for understanding the subtly of judicial rhetoric associated with the constitution. The Court may
claim that the clause violates the constitution, but it lacks the ability to
enforce such a violation solely from a constitutional jurisdiction perspective. Therefore, reference to the constitution is immediately followed by mention of violations of labor laws and regulations as well as
socialist morality. These last two items are judiciable under Article 58
of the General Principles of Civil Law which stipulates, "Civil acts falling
into the following categories shall be considered null and void... (5)
those violating the law or public interests .. "91 Although the Court did
not expressly cite Article 58, it is clear from the language that it provided the 'authority' with which the Court could invalidate the liability
exclusion clause while the constitution provided the reasoning.
B. The Case of Liu Ming v No. 8 EngineeringCompany of Division No. 2
of the No. 20 Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Railways and Luo
Youmin92
In August of 1998, the No. 8 Engineering Company of Division No.
2 of the No. 20 Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Railways under-

89. The term used here is "labor regulations" or "regulations on labor" (laodong faze), yet I
have been unable to find the labor laws or regulations the court is referring to. The Labor Law of
the People's Republic of China was not promulgated until 1994, so I think that they may be referring either to a statute, which I am unable to find or perhaps they are referring to the Economic
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China. See Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 13, 1981, effective Jul.
1, 1982), translated in Chinalaw Information Service. The Economic Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China was replaced by the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (effective
Oct. 1, 1999).
90. Zhang Lianqi and Zhang Guo Li v Zhang Xuezhen, ChinalawInformation Service, Dec. 24,
1998, at 2 (author's translation).
91. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by
Nat'l People's Cong., effective Jan. 1, 1989) art. 58, translatedin ChinalawInformation Service.
92. Liu Ming v No. 8 Engineering Company of Division No. 2 of the No. 20 Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Railways and Luo Youmin, Chinalaw Information Service, May 17, 2001
(People's Ct. of Meishan Cnty., Sichuan Province).
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took a construction project on the Xilaiyan Bridge of the Meishan section of rail line 106.93 Construction of driveway panels was subcontracted to Luo Youmin with a contract clause stating that liability for
any and all accidents of injury, death, or dismemberment were the sole
responsibility of LuO.94 Work began on September 2, but before starting Luo Youmin held a series of meetings emphasizing the dangers of
the installing the driveway panels and the proper methods of installation so as to maintain safety.9s On October 6, Liu Ming, a hired laborer,
failed to follow these proper procedures when handling the panels,
which caused ten tons of driveway panels to fall and injure his left
hand.96 Liu Ming was rushed to the hospital and released twenty-one
days later with all medical expenses being borne by Luo Youmin.97
Later on March 5, 1999, Liu Ming's injury was examined by medical
experts and an injury resulting in the loss of the use of his left hand
was confirmed.98 Liu Ming brought a claim against both Luo Youmin
and the No. 8 Engineering Company in the People's Court of Meishan
County, Sichuan requesting compensation for, inter alia,loss of income,
subsequent hospital fees, living subsidies, and legal fees.99
The Court held that both Luo Youmin and the No. 8 Engineering
Company would bear joint liability in compensating Liu Ming's
claims.loo As in the previous case, the Court found a legal basis for its
decision by combining an implied right to labor protection for civilian
workers with promulgated statutes over which the judiciary had enforcement authority. Yet, whereas the Court in the previous case merely referenced the idea of implied right to labor protection in an
unnamed constitutional provision without direct quotation, in the present case the Court expressly cited Article 42 paragraph 2 of the constitution.i01 Also different from the previous case, was the fact that that
the Courts now had authority to enforce the Labor Law of the People's
Republic of China (hereafter, Labor Law (1994)), which was officially
promulgated in 1994 and entered into force in 1995. Reflecting the
government's growing concern over the phenomenal economic growth

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.at 2-3.
Id. at 2.
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of China and its attempts to negotiate burgeoning capitalist influences
on the socialist market economy, this piece of legislation was intended
to regulate employer/employee relationships and provide laborers
with an adequate level of protection from 'capitalist' exploitation.102
This is evinced by the lead article of the legislation, which states:
[Purpose of Legislation] This Law is hereby formulated in accordance with the Constitution in order to protect the legitimate rights
and interests of laborers, readjust the labor relationship, establish
and safeguard the labor system suitable to the socialist market
economy, and promote economic development and social progress.103
Furthermore, the Labor Law (1994) expressly states and defines
laborers' right to occupational safety and made its violation judiciable
in normal courts. Article 3 states that "laborers enjoy the right to be
employed on an equal basis, choose occupations, obtain remunerations
for labor, take rests, have holidays and leave, receive labor safety and
sanitation protection, obtain professional skills training..." and Article
4 states "[t]he employer shall, in accordance with the law, establish
and perfect rules and regulations and ensure that laborers enjoy labor
rights and fulfill their labor obligations"104 Indeed, it was through their
power to enforce these two articles that the Court held the defendants
liable.
It was held that Luo Youmin knew that the dangers of installing
driveway panels with manual labor were greater than if he had used
the more expensive alternative of employing cranes.ios His initial
meetings for the purpose of promoting worker safety were insufficient
and he should have provided greater safety measures and onsite supervision.106 Therefore, his actions failed to provide for Liu Ming's
constitutional and statutory right to occupational safety.107 As in the
previous case, the Court had to address a liability exclusion clause, yet
in this case the contract was between the two defendants, Luo Youmin
and No. 8 Engineering Company. The clause transferred sole liability
102. Labor Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by President of the People's
Republic of China, July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translatedin ChinalawInformationService.
103. Id. (author's translation)
104. Id (author's translation with emphasis added)
105. Liu Ming v No. 8 Engineering Company of Division No. 2 of the No. 20 Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Railways and Luo Youmin, Chinalaw Information Service, May 17, 2001, at
2 (People's Ct. of Meishan Cnty., Sichuan Province).
106. Id.
107. It should be noted that the negligence related to Liu Ming's personal actions was considered, yet the Court determined that since he was not a professional in railway construction his
conduct did not limit the liability of Luo.
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for work-related injuries or deaths to Luo Youmin.108 Again, the Court
held that the No. 8 Engineering Company was liable because the clause
violated the labor rights protected by both the constitution and the
Labor Law (1994), and as such, was considered a null and void civil act
according to the aforementioned item 5 of paragraph 1 of Article 58 of
the General Principles of Civil Law (which it expressly cites).1o9 Here
again, we see the Court employing the constitution in its judgments to
affirm a particular labor right and the State's duty to enforce such a
right, and then enforcing the said right through the application of statutory law.
C.

The Case of Long iankang v Zhongzhou ConstructionEngineering
Co., Ltd., Traffic Bureau of Yongsheng County, Yunnan, and]iang
Jianguollo

In the following case, the Court was faced with a similar set of
facts (i.e., a laborer was injured at the work site and claims compensation), yet the reasoning of the judges differs significantly. While still
relying on the constitution in conjunction with the Labor Law (1994)
for the source of a labor right, the Court does not decide the case solely
according to a violation of a right to labor protection, and instead cites
a failure to provide the constitutionally guaranteed right to proper
vocational training.
The Zhongzhou Construction Engineering Co. contracted with
Traffic Bureau to complete a proposed "Transit Line Project" and
placed Jiang Jian'guo as the project leader.iii On January 16, 1999,
Long Jiankang, a contract steel bender, incorrectly constructed a steelreinforcing structure and was ordered by Jiang Jian'guo to reconstruct
it.112 While tearing down the reinforced steel shelf it fell upon him.113
He suffered a compression fracture of his lumbar vertebra, which left
him paralyzed and completely incapable of caring for himself.114 Long
Jiankang went to People's Court of Yongsheng County requesting an
order requiring the three defendants to provide compensation for,
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Long Jiankang v Zhongzhou Construction Engineering Co., Ltd., Traffic Bureau of
Yongsheng County, Yunnan, and Jiang Jianguo, Chinalaw information Service, Apr. 11, 2000 (People's Ct. of Yongsheng Cnty., Yunnan Province).
111.

Id. at 1.

112. Id. at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.

CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM

2012]

87

inter alia, economic loss, life subsidies, and continuous care fees, totaling 271,306.08 RMB.11s
All three defendants denied any responsibility for labor protection
at the construction site. The Traffic Bureau maintained that it was
merely a supervisory body, and since a labor contract had never been
signed between it and the plaintiff, there could not exist a legal duty to
provide labor protection or compensation for work-related injury.116
The Zhongzhou Construction Co. contended that Jiang Jian'guo was
only nominally part of the company and was working on this particular
project on his own.117 As such, there was no labor contract, nor was
there an employment relationship between the company and the plaintiff so as to give rise to a statutory duty to provide compensation for
work-related injury.118 And finally, Jiang Jian'guo maintained that he
should be held to limited liability, due to the fact that he had earlier
provided the materials for reinforcing the steel shelf and had warned
Long Jiankang of the danger.119
In deciding the case, the Court held that the Traffic Bureau did not
have an official labor relationship with the plaintiff, and as such should
bear no civil liability for the work injury.12o However, the Court decided against the defendants, Zhongzhou Co. and Jiang Jian'guo.121 In so
doing, the Court had to address two issues. First, it needed to establish
which labor right had been violated and whether or not there was a
method of enforcement available in the existing Labor Laws. From the
previous cases, it would seem likely that paragraph 2 of Article 42 in
the constitution would be cited and that the case would be decided on
occupational safety violations. To the extent that occupational safety
was an issue, this is true; however, the Court found that the defendants' negligence related to occupational safety stemmed not from a
violation of paragraph 2, but from paragraph 4 which states: "The State
provides necessary vocational training for citizens before they are employed."122

It was held that the Zhongzhou Co. assigned the project to Jiang
Jian'guo and offered no further training or supervision to Jiang or any
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
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of the laborers Jiang hired (including the plaintiff).123 For his part, the
Court held that Jiang hired the plaintiff and merely gave random information about work issues and did not "carefully provid[e] vocational training."124 This lack of education was seen as the source of a
dangerous work environment, which by extension infringed upon the
plaintiffs right to occupational safety.125 The power to enforce this
was found, as in the previous case, in Article 3 of the Labor Law (1994)
which states that laborers "enjoy the right to be employed on an equal
basis, choose occupations, obtain remunerations for labor, take rests,
have holidays and leave, receive labor safety and sanitation protection,
obtain professional skills training.. ."126 Thus, the plaintiffs right to
occupational safety was violated through the inaction of the defendants in providing an adequate level of training.127
The second issue facing the Court was the need to ascertain the
validity of a contract clause between Zhongzhou Co. and Jiang Jian'guo,
which stated that all work related accidents, injuries, deaths, etc. were
the sole responsibility of Jiang.128 As in both of the previous cases, the

Court easily invalidated the clause by concluding that it violated the
constitution and relevant sections of the Labor Law.129 Thus,
Zhongzhou Co. was held jointly liable.13o
Interestingly, this decision would certainly have held in the previous case, where the Court stated that the defendant Luo Youmin's failure rested in his lack of instruction and guidance at the workplace.
However, in that case the Court only referred to the constitution provisions and Labor Law related to the occupational safety and the work
environment and did not press the issue of education. The present case
shows a much more nuanced reading of constitutional language which
allowed the Court to interpret a causal relationship between the infringement of one constitutional provision (vocational training) and a
subsequent infringement (occupational safety).

123. Id.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. See Labor Law of the People's Republic of China (1995) art. 3 (author's translation with
emphasis added).
127. Long ]iankang,at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The cases examined above illustrate several key issues related to
Chinese constitutionalism, point to potential weaknesses in the methods commonly employed by scholars to study Chinese constitutional
development, and provide fertile ground for future research.
First, the Chinese cases examined above show a need to break
away from approaches predicated on American constitutional paradigms when examining Chinese constitutional law, and expanding the
comparative referents within comparative constitutional law in general. Such paradigms focus narrowly on the influence of upper-level
court decisions and the ideology of judicial review, specifically actions
of the SPC, and fail to consider the role of lower level courts in developing and promoting Chinese constitutionalism. Balme's analysis of the
growing rights discourse in local Tribunals and the constitutional arguments used by county and intermediate court judges over the legal
claims made by Wu Shaohui against the village governance committee,
and the labor contract disputes of the Zhang family, Liu Ming, and Long
Jiankang, all demonstrate the value of examining low-level court decisions for evidence of constitutionalism, as opposed to the lack of a
rights discourse within statements of the NPC or SPC.
Second, the fact that constitutional discourse is present in lowlevel Chinese court decisions on a much larger scale than in SPC judgments has serious implications for interpreting how different levels of
the Chinese judiciary understand their interpretive/enforcement role
vis-A-vis the constitution. In particular, there is evidence that constitutional discourse and rights advocacy are permitted, or perhaps tolerated, in cases that are not appealed to high-level courts. One possible
explanation is that cases which do make it to the higher courts, such as
the Qi Yuling case, draw a great deal of public attention to the upper
levels of the Chinese government. Keith Hand notes that Chinese judges in higher courts (including the SPC) complain of increased government interference over cases that have drawn considerable media or
public attention.131 In some cases, media attention can indeed provoke
legal reforms, yet such attention can be a double-edge sword resulting
negatively in a governmental backlash.132 Balancing constitutional
cases and rights activism in the public sphere remains a difficult chal131. Keith J.Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving
Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China, 45 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114, 183-85
(2006).
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lenge. These judges are therefore reluctant to consider cases which
might provoke media scrutiny of top-level government actions and
decisions, or provoke the public's ire and criticism. In contrast, lower
courts, though still burdened by potential administrative reviews, are
not necessarily impeded by media attention, and are therefore more
open to making constitutional interpretations and claims, if public interest in the case is low.
Third, the rights issues involved within these cases are frequently
'horizontally' oriented. That is, they are civil cases in which the State
(in the form of the judiciary) makes decisions concerning one individual whose constitutional rights were allegedly infringed upon by another individual. In this sense, the Chinese cases are unlike the German
constitutional cases analyzed by Mattias Kumm. In the latter, the state
was still the object of the litigation, and the 'indirect effect' was merely
forcing the State to carry out its constitutional duty. In the Chinese
cases, there is evidence of a 'direct effect' mentality in that judges are
drawing on constitutional principles when adjudicating private litigation. These cases are between individuals where the judges argue that
1) the State has a constitutional duty to ensure labor safety (through
training, safety regulations, etc.), and 2) if a labor contract violates a
constitutionally enshrined labor right or impedes the state's ability to
enforce such a right (e.g., a limitation of liability clause for worker injuries), the state has the duty to void such a clause. Further, because of
the dynamics of the case, the state is not the target of litigation, and can
actually be seen in a positive light as an agent of justice. These horizontal rights cases do not call into question actions of the CCP or the Chinese central government, nor do they threaten the authority of the
NPC. Lower court cases with horizontal rights orientation may therefore prove to be the ideal realm in which to witness the future development of Chinese constitutionalism.
Finally, the legal cases related to labor issues illustrate the importance of examining different types of rights which may be valued
differently within political regimes not conforming to the liberal democratic paradigm. Anita Chan has written rather critically about the myopic nature of human rights discourse emanating from international
organizations, governments, and scholars.133 She argues that the current rights discourse is dominated by concerns with vertical rights and
their violations by developing nations, yet such an emphasis fails to
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consider other rights which need to be protected.134 By highlighting
practices of worker exploitation prevalent in China (and elsewhere in
the world), Chan advocates an expansion of rights categories within
the current discourse to include labor rights.135 In particular, Chan
believes that socio-economic rights violations, like labor rights guaranteed by the constitution, are more likely to be horizontal in nature, and
are equally as likely to be overlooked due to the scholarly emphasis on
State encroachment on individual rights.136 Therefore, the cases analyzed above, and others like them, are important for understanding
alternative avenues of constitutional development in China. The Chinese government has had an uneasy relationship with market economies while attempting to maintain and advocate a predominantly
socialist ideology. Labor rights and the potential for labor exploitation
are sources of tension between the Chinese government and the private sector. Yet, because the constitution is embedded with socialist
ideology, the socio-economic rights contained therein prove to be useful tools for the government to monitor and control labor practices.
Thus, when the judiciary makes a judgment based upon the constitution it can do so by portraying their act as one of promoting socialism
and providing justice for the citizens caught in the grasp of the private
sector. From this perspective, constitutional litigation actually
strengthens the bond between the state and citizens.
This article is not intended to answer all the questions brought up
in the above sections, but I hope that these questions will open the
doors to future research on Chinese constitutionalism, and constitutionalism in general, that is not overly confined by Amero-centric understanding of constitutional development and design.
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